Seeking an Effective Future:

An Assessment and Research Report on the activities of Florida Hurricane Relief Fund

May 2005

Prepared for:
The Volunteer Florida Foundation
The Florida Hurricane Relief Fund

Prepared by:
The Sagamore Institute for Policy Research
Indianapolis, Indiana

Seeking an Effective Future:

An Assessment and Research Report on the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund

May 2005

Prepared for:
The Volunteer Florida Foundation
www.volunteerflorida.org

The Florida Hurricane Relief Fund
www.flahurricanerelief.org

401 South Monroe Street
The Elliot Building
Tallahassee, Fl 32301

Prepared by:
The Sagamore Institute for Policy Research
Indianapolis, Indiana
www.sipr.org

CONTENTS:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2

Introduction to **THE FUND**…**6**

Introduction to **THE STUDY**…**10**

IN REVIEW: An Assessment of Phase I & II Activities…**13**

THE FUTURE: Establishing Options and Models…**25**

APPENDIX

Executive Summary

In 2004, the State of Florida was hit with four major hurricanes precipitating the establishment of the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund (the Fund) by Governor Jeb Bush. Administered by the Volunteer Florida Foundation, the Fund became the repository and re-funding agent for over $20 million in private monetary and in-kind resources for disaster recovery across the State of Florida.

The Fund established a policy for funding "unmet needs"—those needs remaining after available State and Federal resources were exhausted. Through two phases of funding, the Fund has distributed approximately $13.4 million to 80 organizations. In many instances, such funding was directed through local "unmet needs committees" to uninsured and under-insured families for assistance with rent, deductibles, home repair and medical expenses. In other instances, the Fund provided resources directly to local nonprofit organizations that were ineligible for State and Federal relief funds.

As the Fund establishes guidelines for Phase III, it has asked the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research to help review the effectiveness of its procedures in Phase I and Phase II in order to determine the best strategy and timing for distribution of Phase III resources. The body of this document explores our findings in detail.

Key Recommendations for Phase III

The most urgent question for the Fund, as Florida approaches the 2005 hurricane season, is how to allocate remaining Phase III funding for maximum impact. Rebuilding from the 2004 hurricane devastation will be a long-term process requiring several years of construction and redevelopment of Florida communities. Because of the scope and scale of the disaster, the Florida legislature recently appropriated an additional $250 million of funding to provide rental recovery, housing recovery, and multifamily mortgage assistance for the redevelopment of affordable rental properties. This is only one stream of new funding that has been appropriated for long-term recovery needs in recent weeks, and as these new funds come available, the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund must yet again reassess its definition of "unmet needs" in order not to duplicate resource allocations that may now be met by state or federal funding.

The Fund has approximately $5 million available to allocate for Phase III distributions. While these are not insignificant resources, they are small in comparison to the larger streams of state and federal relief and recovery dollars. It is encumbent on the Fund, therefore, to consider how to target these resources to needs that remain truly "unmet" in order to maximize their impact. A review of the Fund's process and learning to date points to some important strategic needs that the Fund is well positioned to address.

Based on the findings of this study, which gathered and analyzed data on the funding process to date, the Study Team makes the following recommendations for achieving the most strategic and equitable deployment of Phase III funds.

***In the next 1-2 months** . . .*

- Solicit proposals for grants targeted at the emerging long-term recovery organizations. These grants should be used to supplement administrative needs (not to duplicate or displace existing paid staff arrangements) and stimulate networking initiatives to enhance the capacity of these groups as effective intermediaries to local providers during disaster response and long-term recovery.

- Solicit proposals for local needs related to the provision of community-wide material resources such as volunteer housing, community volunteer centers and, in cases where no other options can be found, warehousing space for building supplies.

The study team believes that one of the most significant funding gaps that has emerged in the process of long-term recovery is the lack of available funds to provide administrative support to facilitate the activities of newly incorporating long-term relief committees across the state. Many long-term recovery organizations have been established in recent months in Florida, and the study team believes this is a promising development in advancing the ability of communities to have in place effective collaborative processes for managing the complex business of disaster recovery and mitigation.

The materialization of a network of long-term recovery organizations with independent 501(c)(3) status promises to facilitate and improve the work of frontline service and care providers and in many instances supplement local efforts to deliver direct relief and recovery services. Existing resources yet to be allocated will in most instances be deployed more effectively and efficiently as better collaborative processes are put in place on the ground in Florida communities. The long-term recovery organizations seem to be the most promising location for these coordination functions to be developed and sustained.

Such a network could also, in future disasters, improve the work of the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund itself by uniting the functions of allocation decision and fiscal agent and displacing the need for the creation by the Fund of ad hoc Unmet Needs Committees. While the Unmet Needs Committees were a necessary innovation in the rapidly evolving situation in 2004-05, these groups have had varying degrees of success in fostering community responsiveness, flexibility and creativity in the high pressure, chaotic post-disaster environment. By issuing a call for proposals targeted at improving the organizational capacity of the long-term recovery organizations, the Fund can be an important catalyst to promoting recovery infrastructure and habits of cooperation that will pay dividends for Floridians long into the future.

The area of community-wide material needs such as volunteer housing and materials warehouses was among the most frequently cited challenges we heard in our interview

process. Some communities have been creative in their use of Phase II funding to supply such critical community-wide needs. The Fund can promote such models of creative and strategic resource allocation to other counties by making grant resources available specifically for such targeted needs.

We recommend, therefore, that the Fund immediately issue a Request for Proposals for Phase III funding payable during the next 3-9 months directly to incorporated long-term recovery organizations, or in cases where such organizations have yet to be incorporated, through the existing unmet needs committee process, to be used for 1) organizing and administrative support of their local long-term recovery organization and/or 2) supplying critical community-wide facilities such as volunteer housing and warehouses for building supplies to be used by local rebuild providers.

In the next 3-6 months…

Because of the pending release of additional state and federal dollars into the recovery field, the Fund is preparing a new comprehensive review of Hurricane Funding Sources. Once this review is complete and there is a clearer picture of where new resources may be allocated, there remain two additional critical areas in which the study team believes that the resources of the Fund can supplement and provide critical leverage for these larger funding streams:

- In the next 3-6 months, the Fund should continue to give strong consideration to the needs of local nonprofits and faith-based organizations to repair hurricane damage and restore them to pre-disaster capacity. The Fund has already made many important donations of this kind, and the Study Team believes this is a strategic use of resources as effective social sector organizations help local communities deal better at the local level with the problems they face and quickly restore the continuum of care and quality of life in their communities.

- In the next 3-6 months, once it can be substantiated that these requests are not redundant with new State or Federal allocations in these areas, the Fund should give consideration to ongoing direct rebuild and recovery costs. One of the frustrations of trying to fund "unmet needs" and "long-term recovery" has been that because of the scope and scale of the 2004 devastation, the amount of State and Federal funding available has changed. To ensure that all available resources are being tapped, the Fund should avoid providing resources in areas that may be covered by new allocations by the State of Florida.

By the end of calendar year 2005 . . .

While the Fund may extend payouts for needs stemming from the 2004 hurricane season well into 2006 or 2007, the study team believes that allocations of the initial corpus raised for 2004 hurricane recovery should ideally be assigned by the end of calendar year 2005.

The Study Team finds little justification for creating a set-aside from 2004 funding against future "unmet needs" stemming from the 2004 hurricane season.

As Florida is now entering the next hurricane season, the Fund may face new disaster situations. In order to respond most effectively to new challenges, closure of 2004 allocations as soon as possible will allow the Fund to reassess lessons learned from its successful first year of operation and to implement revised fiduciary policies as necessary.

In particular reconsideration of the Fund's extremely low 3% cap on administrative expenses should be reassessed by the board, and the structure of utilizing unmet needs committees should be reevaluated.

Closing the 2004-specific allocations will also provide a natural point at which the governing and advisory boards of the Fund may reflectively deliberate the future status and mission of the Fund and will allow for any new funding raised during subsequent seasons to be allocated according to a more clearly defined mission and appropriately revised policies.

Key Recommendations for the Future

Clearly, through the generosity of its donors and the dedication of its staff, the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund has done great things in a short period of time. However, this study has clearly observed that there needs to be a clearer definition of Mission for the Fund to work effectively in the future in the context of disaster relief and recovery in the State of Florida.

A critical question that should be before the Board and staff of the Fund is the extent to which the Fund may play a role in shaping the context of disaster relief and recovery in the State of Florida. Our previous recommendation in support of building the capacity of the emerging breed of long-term recovery organizations presents a bias toward leveraging the impact of future philanthropic aid for disaster recovery through support for a network of such collaborative organizations that can bring long-term recovery issues to bear sooner and more effectively in the wake of disasters.

In addition to supporting an infrastructure that will afford the most effective and cooperative engagement of the nonprofit sector in hurricane recovery, we believe that the Fund is well positioned to continue to play a leadership role in mobilizing private sector philanthropy for long-term hurricane recovery, especially by continuing its successful work in building partnerships with the corporate community in communities across Florida and throughout the nation.

This report presents models that we believe will be helpful as the Board and staff begin discussing the future of the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund as a leading player in Florida's ongoing campaign against the periodic ravages of nature.

Introduction to THE FUND

In 2004, the State of Florida was hit with four major hurricanes—Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne—each of whose relief costs are in the top ten of natural disasters as ranked by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As of January 31, 2005, FEMA relief costs associated with the 2004 hurricane season in Florida were already in excess of $5 billion.

Within days of the first hurricane, Florida Governor Jeb Bush established the Hurricane Charley Relief Fund to collect and distribute private philanthropic donations to support hurricane relief and recovery. Housed at and administered by the Volunteer Florida Foundation (VFF), the Hurricane Charley Relief Fund quickly accepted donations for distribution. However, within a month, after the second hurricane hit, the fund was renamed the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund (the Fund) and charged with a larger effort and mission. Two additional hurricanes hit the state in the next month, bringing the total to four and making the efforts of the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund all that more critical to the relief and recovery of devastated Floridians.

In retrospect, these hurricanes were selective. They brought little destruction to Florida's large cities, which, if they had been hit, might have had higher monetary damage, but also would have had the most resources for relief and recovery. Rather, they seemed to focus the brunt of their attention on the populations in Florida that would have the most to lose by such an event. The under- or uninsured, the homeless, the migrant worker population, elderly, and rural low income residents were all severally affected and had the least amount of capacity to handle such an event.

On the eve of a new hurricane season in 2005, the Volunteer Florida Foundation and the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund have paused momentarily to assess their work to date and to evaluate how best to disseminate the funds remaining for Phase III (and beyond) of the 2004 recovery effort. This study, developed by the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research (SIPR) of Indianapolis, Indiana, is the resulting assessment and series of recommendations for the future.

The FUND: A Proud Accomplishment of Assisting Those in Need

Despite only 8 months of time since the arrival of the first hurricane, The Fund has much to look back on with pride:

- In excess of $20 million has been raised from private sources to address needs unmet by other established sources of support for relief and recovery (FEMA, state and local dollars, and first response organizations such as the Red Cross).
- In Phase I and II, approximately $13.4 million has been successfully allocated to over 80 organizations across the state of Florida, with grants ranging from just over $1,000 to in excess of $700,000.

- Recognizing that State and Federal relief funds would fall short of the material needs of the poorest Floridians, the Fund has provided in excess of $8 million to be allocated by county-based "unmet needs committees" for local relief and recovery needs.
- Recognizing the critical role of civil society organizations in providing the human touch and social capital critically needed in relief and recovery efforts, the Fund has responded with flexibility to assist a variety of not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) and faith-based organizations (FBOs) with targeted grants to repair facilities and restore services such as child care, medical care, hospice, and direct relief services to special populations such as the elderly and migrant workers.
- The Fund has implemented appropriate administration, oversight, administrative, and fiscal controls in order to account for all funds collected and distributed.
- The Fund has played an important role in public relations and communications efforts to keep the needs of Floridians in the eye of the public, both in Florida and around the globe—despite being overshadowed in the midst of their efforts by the tragic December 2004 tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia.
- The Fund has adhered to its commitment, made when it was established to address needs stemming from only the first hurricane, to keep administrative costs to a remarkably low 3%.

With strong commitment, the administrative team for the Fund embraced a devastating situation and did not hesitate in quickly moving forward to get resources from donors, who responded with tremendous compassion, to those organizations and individuals in need of aid. As one constituent who responded to the SIPR survey put it, the Fund team proved "very responsive to new ways of looking at things." Four massively devastating hurricanes within two months make such responsiveness and willingness to make mid-course adjustments highly valuable and the SIPR survey respondents consistently indicated that VFF/FHRF had been invaluable to their recovery efforts.

The FUND: A Summary to Date

When one disaster was just being assessed, another would hit, at times impacting the same communities. The result was an unprecedented need for coordinated response both in terms of delivering short-term relief and in addressing long-term recovery issues. FEMA sums up the typical process below:

> *There is a point in the disaster recovery process where local officials and residents begin to shift their attention from immediate response to recovery. Generally speaking, it occurs after critical lifelines have been re-established, shelters and temporary housing are in place, and debris clearance/disposal is underway. This shift generally occurs between two and four weeks after the event. The community relations staff – which interacts directly with disaster victims, concerned citizens, and local officials – can be helpful in providing insight on the "pulse" of the community.* (FEMA)

Given the scope and scale of devastation in Florida in 2004, however, the lines between immediate response and recovery were easily blurred and this shift in attention was delayed in many areas. With four paths of destruction to address, manpower and resources were stretched thin across Florida, and individuals and agencies with the most knowledge and expertise in how to catalyze effective community coordination of long-term recovery efforts faced unusual logistical challenges. In retrospect, recovering from the devastation wrought by Hurricane Andrew now looks like a textbook case in simplicity, given the ability of relief agencies to converge largely on one disaster trail.

Today, even months later, many localities across Florida are still faced with long lists of people and organizations in need of immediate repairs. Unfortunately, many have deemed the new state flag of Florida to be the "blue tarp" for all the coverings over roofs that have blown away. Long-term recovery is also challenged by the growing incidence of secondary damage through moisture and mildew to homes still on the waiting lists for repair.

Communities are mobilizing resources for long-term recovery in a variety of ways, depending on where strong leadership has emerged. This customization of processes to the assets of each community has meant that no one model of allocating Fund resources has proved universally effective across the state. In a few localities county governments provided excellent collaborative leadership, but in others these systems were too bureaucratic and too focused on immediate response to be effective leaders of long-term recovery.

Seeking the most fluid and effective means of getting funds for unmet needs into the field, the Fund quickly adopted the procedure of requiring each county to establish an "Unmet Needs Committee" (UNC) to tap into the leadership of locally-based not-for-profit and volunteer organizations such as the United Way, the Red Cross, and faith-based organizations, as well as the business sector. These coordinating bodies provided superb leadership in some locales, but in others they were unable to attract the most dynamic leadership and to move outside existing ways of thinking to mount timely, creative, and effective means of dealing with long-term recovery needs.

Meanwhile, in some locales, another type of coordinating group emerged to play a significant role. FEMA increasingly encourages and facilitates the development of long-term recovery committees (LTRCs) that can identify needs, marshall funding and volunteer resources, and execute planning after FEMA response teams leave the area. LTRCs often prove an important clearinghouse for case management and resource allocations, but some prove more effective than others. In 2004/5, LTRCs have been an important part of the disaster recovery landscape.

Florida has also benefited from the presence of a unique organization that exists to further facilitate the development of such committees: Florida Interfaith Networking in Disaster (FIND). In many areas, FIND has played a critical role in facilitating the establishment of a special breed of LTRO they call a Community Interfaith/Interagency Network

(CIIN). CIINs are defined as an inclusive Community-Based Group organized to identify and assist in the resolution of disaster related unmet needs. Such groups typically tap into highly motivated leadership in the faith community but also seek intentionally to include representatives from churches, faith based organizations, social service organizations, civic organizations, private businesses, health care providers, government, and individuals.

In many areas of Florida, LTRCs/CIINs, sparked by local initiative and catalyzed and advised by FIND and other not-for-profit and faith-based disaster agencies, are emerging as the most dynamic and effective coordinators of long-term recovery collaborations. In many instances, these organizations are bringing effective models of collaborative decision-making processes together with fiscal agency capacity by formally incorporating as independent 501 (c)(3) organizations (LTROs). These organizations have effectively "taken the bull by the horns" and worked to seek simple, low-cost and effective solutions to the problems still plaguing their communities. They are also positioning themselves to become ever-ready community-rooted organizations that can direct ongoing efforts for the mitigation of, and the readiness for, future disasters.

As the Fund evaluates the effectiveness of Phase I and Phase II resource allocations and prepares to distribute the balance of its 2004 resources in a final Phase III, the effectiveness of all of these existing and emerging models of recovery coordination must be carefully examined with an eye to the future.

Introduction to THE STUDY

Recognizing the need to effectively evaluate the past efforts of Phase I and II and to obtain recommendations for Phase III, the Volunteer Florida Foundation/Florida Hurricane Relief Fund retained the Sagamore Institute for Policy Research of Indianapolis, Indiana to conduct a timely research study and survey assessment. The study's timeframe was an approximately 30 day period during the month of May 2005, with members of the Sagamore team attending the Florida Governor's Hurricane Conference in Tampa on May 11, 2005.

What are the GOALS of this study?

This research study seeks to address three types of questions for the Volunteer Florida Foundation/Florida Hurricane Relief Fund:

- ***How effective was the Fund in working with local organizations in Phase I & II?*** In disaster relief situations there are clear and present material needs that must be met as well as additional needs that will influence the long-term economic and community development of affected families and communities. Addressing "unmet needs" requires both careful forethought and proper reflection and evaluation. This study will review the organizational models of Phase I & II of the Fund and assess whether the fund disbursements of Phase I and II were targeted as strategically as possible and whether recipients were effective in their use of the funds.

- ***What "Mission" options need to be clarified before further funding?*** While disaster relief is a top-priority, a discussion of the future mission of the Fund itself is essential in understanding funding leverage and other opportunities for effecting larger social and community development changes. This study presents three organizational mission options for moving forward in Phase III with a clear direction (including related funding allocation assessments).

- ***What opportunities are available for making funds for Phase III the most effective and efficient for making a stronger Florida?*** This study will present several recommendations on how the Fund might best distribute Phase III funds as well as position itself, if it is the objective of its Board and staff, to seek longer-term involvement in the future of Florida.

What is the METHODOLOGY of this study?

Since the funds for Phase I and II have been distributed over a wide geographic area, the SIPR team created a web-based general survey to establish timely understanding and feedback from the network of the Fund. This network included fund recipients, administrators and other Florida stakeholders and generated a wide response for analysis and research in an economical and efficient manner. Numerous members of the network were contacted and we received 50+ responses. (These are fully compiled in the Appendix of this report.)

Prior to the survey, the SIPR team conducted a workshop session in conjunction with the Florida Governor's Hurricane Conference meeting on May 11. Team members were present to discuss past activities and future discussions with VFF/FHRF staff, local organizations and recipients and other participants in the VFF/FHRF special meeting session. The results of this interaction gave team members a basis for review and evaluation.

Following the workshop, which provided an even greater understanding of issues and opportunities, the SIPR team chose a sample of organizations and communities that received additional interview and discussion. These "interview studies" explored past activities in communities and occurred via phone in the days following the May 11 workshop. These interviews supplied additional detailed information and allowed for the team to understand the diverse range of organizational models emerging in these communities.

With all the obtained information and case study development, the SIPR team processed and researched the findings and, utilizing its unique professional expertise, has prepared a series of final recommendations for the Fund which is the basis for this report.

How is this document organized?

This study is organized in the following manner:

1. **Executive Summary and Recommendations.** This section of the report outlines the Sagamore Institute Team's key recommendations for the future of the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund.
2. **Review.** This section of the document highlights major themes or issues that the team saw or heard repeatedly throughout the process in addition to a critical review of how various communities dealt with VFF/FHRF and developed their own recovery organization models. Sample "Case Snapshots" are included in this section.
3. **The Future.** Recognizing the need for immediate focus and direction for Phase III, the team presents several options for clarifying the Fund's mission focus as activities of the Fund move forward. These options are then detailed into a discussion of pro/con and various issues and opportunities with each.
4. **Appendix.** As a supplement to the document the following is included in the appendix:
   - Survey Study Questions
   - Survey Results (Anonymous)
   - The Sagamore Project Team
   - Articles/Research for Further Review

IN REVIEW:

An Assessment of Phase I & II

A tremendous amount of assistance has been offered by a variety of local, state and national organizations to assist those in need in the communities of the State of Florida. As this study has reviewed numerous comments, surveys and interviews with key players in the process, it has become clear that all of them have shown exceptional commitment, heart and dedication to the cause of recovery and rebuilding.

The assessment that follows is intended to be a general review based on very preliminary information (due to a 30 day project timeframe). There is no intention to single out organizations as "best" or "worst", but rather to discuss options and opportunities for improving the efforts of the collective whole towards a stronger future. We seek the results of these assessments as learning opportunities. It has, in fact, been a learning experience for all, and taking time to intentionally reflect on what has transpired will provide essential information when the next event strikes the State of Florida.

This section of the report is divided in the following manner:

1. Review of the Organizational Structure of VFF/FHRF
2. Review of the Organizational Functionality of Local Groups
3. Four Case "Snapshots"
4. Assessment of Issues

Review of the Organizational Structure of VFF/FHRF

The following information showcases the quantitative results of our online survey of various organizations and individuals that have interacted with or been affiliated with the Volunteer Florida Foundation or the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund.

Note that responses are shown for three respondent populations:

1. all respondents (51 respondents)
2. respondents who are members of an Unmet Needs Committee or Long Term Recovery Committee (32 respondents)
3. respondents who are not members of an Unmet Needs Committee or Long Term Recovery Committee but who applied for funding, received funding or interacted in some manner with the Volunteer Florida Foundation/Florida Hurricane Relief Fund (19 respondents)

5) Are you a member of a Volunteer Florida Foundation/Hurricane Relief Fund Unmet Needs or Long-Term Recovery Committee?	
Yes	62.7%
No	37.3%

15) The application procedures and rules for the Hurricane Relief Fund were clear and understandable.	Total	On Committee	Not on Committee
Strongly Disagree	4%	0%	11%
Disagree	14%	22%	0%
Agree	45%	44%	47%
Strongly Agree	33%	28%	42%
No Response	4%	6%	0%

16) The Volunteer Florida Foundation /Hurricane Relief Fund staff were responsive, helpful, and could clearly answer questions and provide support during the process.	Total	On Committee	Not on Committee
Strongly Disagree	0%	0%	0%
Disagree	2%	3%	0%
Agree	33%	31%	37%
Strongly Agree	51%	47%	58%
No Response	14%	19%	5%

17) In my opinion the project(s) for which my organization received funding from Volunteer Florida Foundation /Hurricane Relief Fund were effective in providing assistance following the 2004 hurricanes.	Total	On Committee	Not on Committee
Strongly Disagree	6%	3%	11%
Disagree	2%	3%	0%
Agree	22%	19%	26%
Strongly Agree	51%	53%	47%
No Response	20%	22%	16%

Throughout the course of this study review, the theme that the staff team of the Fund did an excellent job in difficult circumstances was evident. With limited staff, the Fund covered a diverse geographic range of the State of Florida and was seen as very responsive to questions and understanding any misunderstood directives.

The survey did reveal a variety of opinions about how the future of the Fund should look. These options will be outlined in the FUTURE section of this report.

Review of the Organizational Functionality of Local Groups

The following information was received as a part of the online study:

11) The **jurisdiction** in which my organization works had a disaster response plan prior to the 2004 hurricanes.

	Total	On Committee	Not on Committee
Yes	71%	72%	68%
No	25%	22%	32%

12) In my opinion, my jurisdiction's disaster response plan was effective?

	Total	On Committee	Not on Committee
Strongly Disagree	2%	3%	0%
Disagree	14%	16%	11%
Agree	49%	53%	42%
Strongly Agree	8%	6%	11%
No Response	27%	22%	37%

14) My organization was able to mobilize quickly to identify needs and apply for funds from Volunteer Florida Foundation.

	Total	On Committee	Not on Committee
Strongly Disagree	6%	9%	0%
Disagree	14%	19%	5%
Agree	43%	38%	53%
Strongly Agree	29%	25%	37%
No Response	8%	9%	5%

In general, in reviewing the organizational systems of various local groups, we found there to be tremendous disparity in how funds were distributed, communication offered and decisions made. While some of this is due to the flexible nature of this whole activity, as you will see in the following matrix and case "snapshots" there a tremendous amount of variation between local organizations.

(Note: 11x17 Matrix: "Organizational Functionality" follows this page of the report)

Organizational Functionality: Examples of a Wide Spectrum of Different Systems (Based on Phone Interviews)

ORGANIZATION CATEGORY	ORGANIZATION TYPE	CASE SNAPSHOT: Polk County, Florida	CASE SNAPSHOT: Palm Beach County, Florida	CASE SNAPSHOT: Charlotte County, Florida	CASE SNAPSHOT: Escambia & Santa Rosa Counties, Florida
INTERMEDIARY / CATALYST ORGANIZATIONS Intermediaries help frontline service providers do what they do better.	Catalysts: Non-Profit and/or Faith-based Coordination Organizations (i.e. FIND, Church World Services)	No response or does not apply.	No response or does not apply.	FIND and Church World Services (CWS) were the major drivers behind the creation and incorporation of IINC. Charlotte County Charities-key dissemination vehicle for UNC information, resources. Includes IINC	FIND closely working with Rebuild Northwest Florida (RNF) RNF is the most dynamic player in the mix. It was formed largely by business leaders to coordinate the recovery initiatives for citizens of Santa Rosa and Escambia Counties impacted by Hurricane Ivan. RNF focuses specifically on rebuilding and repairing the homes of those without insurance or those who are underinsured. They do not do case management, but are frustrated at slowness of groups handling case management.
	Long-Term Relief Committees (LTRC) Long-Term Relief Organizations (LTROs) Community Interfaith/Interagency Networks (CIINs)	Rebuild Polk After Disaster (RPAD) incorporated as 501c3. They are primarily focused on individual case management and helping those who have exhausted other options. Although members of the Unmet Needs Committee attend weekly meetings, there is limited knowledge of funds received by the UNC from the Fund or how to apply for such funds. RPAD has no direct relationship with VFF/FHRF.	No response or does not apply.	Interfaith/Interagency Network of Charlotte County (IINC)—focusing on uninsured and underinsured homeowners. Working closely with FBOs, including Habitat for Humanity. Close relationship between IINC and county government.	Escambia Long-Term Recovery Committee—case management Santa Rosa Long Term Recovery Committee—case management
ALLOCATING BODIES The Unmet Needs Committees were established at the request of VFF/FHRF to function as a volunteer Board of Directors for The Hurricane Relief Fund for their County. The Boards responsibilities are: 1. Policy – Set policies and standards for how the Hurricane Relief Fund dollars will be best utilized within your county. 2. Fiduciary – Oversight of those dollars. Responsibility for making sure that the funds are spent in accordance with the policies set by Volunteer Florida Foundation and the Unmet Needs Committee.	County Governments	Houses UNC?	Helped create UNC	Very involved in UNC process—most effective county sponsorship identified	No response or does not apply.
	UnMet Needs Committees (established by VFF/FHRF)	UNC allocated ~$468,000 for relief and recovery efforts.	UNC allocated over $600,000 for relief and recovery efforts. Palm Beach UNC was spearheaded by the county Emergency Management Team and the local United Way. Not many FBOs involved in the process.	UNC allocated ~$410,000 for relief and recovery.	UNC exist in both Santa Rosa and Escambia counties—together allocated in excess of $1,000,000 for relief and recovery efforts. Business leaders believe that these should have been one regional committee.
	Non-Profit Organizations (i.e. Long Term Recovery Committees, incorporated or unincorporated, other nonprofits)	RPAD not participating in allocation decisions or receiving funds.	Palm Beach LTRC, Glades Area Recovery Team (GART) involved with UNC, though Paul Milelli indicated that the UNC itself was considering incorporating in the role of LTRC.	Habitat for Humanity awarded ~$300,000 for construction of a community volunteer center.	No response or does not apply.
FISCAL AGENTS These organizations acted as Fiscal Agents for funds from the FHRF.	County Governments	No response or does not apply.	No response or does not apply.	Charlotte Co. government serves as fiscal agent for UNC	No response or does not apply.
	Non-Profit Organizations (i.e. United Ways, LTRC's)	United Way of Central Florida for UNC (~$200,000)	United Way for UNC (>$600,000)	United Way involved in due diligence/on site review of proposed projects IINC involved in dissemination of information.	No response or does not apply.

CASE SNAPSHOT:

CHARLOTTE COUNTY

Effective County Government Leadership and Civic Collaboration

Among the most devastated of counties, Charlotte County was among the most creative in developing collaborative processes among various groups to utilize Fund resources effectively for significant capacity-rebuilding projects. Charlotte County Government Director of Recovery Robert Hebert was a key contributor to the flexible and responsive approach of Charlotte County. Hebert had strong relationships with the county not-for-profit sector prior to the hurricane events. This made for ready working relationships and positioned the UNC to effectively identifying critical leverage points in the county, such as immediate needs for restoring child care facilities and developing a central volunteer center.

Existing social service organizations such as the United Way are involved and contribute to the process by helping conduct on-site reviews for local proposals to the UNC. Charlotte County Charities, a local network of social service organizations and Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), plays a key role in disseminating information to organizations and individuals. The local Habitat for Humanity played a central role in construction of a new community volunteer center.

Two key intermediary catalyst organizations—Church World Services and FIND—played central roles in helping to establish and incorporate an effective LTRO/CIIN, the Interfaith/Interagency Network of Charlotte County.

CASE SNAPSHOT:

POLK COUNTY

Social Service-Led Long-Term Recovery

Polk is a non-coastal county that found itself in the path of three of the storms that criss-crossed Florida in 2004. The United Way of Central Florida seems to have become a key hub of disaster recovery funding, serving as the fiscal agent for Florida Hurricane Relief Fund resources as well as for significant grants from Lilly Endowment, the NFL Foundation, and the United Methodist Conference.

Rebuild Polk After Disaster (RPAD) is a new long-term recovery organization that has been created. RPAD seeks to help those who have exhausted other options (either personal savings, FEMA, insurance, etc.) for securing support for rebuilding related activities. If victims have not exhausted all other options, RAPD will serve as a liaison between victims and disaster agencies. RAPD engages in three main activities: assessment, case management, rebuild/repair efforts.

RPAD members include: United Way of Central Florida, the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Lutheran Services-Florida, Lutheran Disaster Response, United Methodist Committee on Relief, Polk County Govt. offices (Unmet Needs Committee), City of Lakeland, Project Hope (Peace River Center for Personal Development), First United Methodist of Lakeland and other organizations. Funding has come mainly from private donors with United Way being the main driver behind fundraising.

Christian Reform World Relief Conference played a key role as catalyst in creating RPAD and in establishing its operational approach and procedures.

There seems to be a significant disconnect between the Polk County UNC (administered by the county?) and RPAD. Although members of the UNC attend weekly meetings, RPAD has no knowledge of funds received by the UNC from the Fund or how to apply for such funds. RPAD has no direct relationship with the Fund.

RPAD also reports that it has been slow to secure involvement of the business community in Polk County. A new initiative with Century 21 may be a positive step in this direction.

CASE SNAPSHOT:

PALM BEACH COUNTY

Disconnected Infrastructure

Palm Beach is a county of sharp contrasts. Larger in area than the state of Delaware, Palm Beach County stretches from the wealthy developments along Florida's "Gold Coast" to interior agricultural lands that produce over 10% of America's sugar. Heavy coastal development is driving housing prices out of the reach of working families, who have moved into bordering northern counties, fostering growth pressures for affordable housing and educational services in these communities.

The Palm Beach UNC was spearheaded by the county Emergency Management Team and the local United Way. The United Way serves as the fiscal agent and provides a dedicated coordinator to the UNC from its own budget (some monies for this position may have been available to them through the Lilly Endowment grant). The UNC communicates funding opportunities to local social service organizations, which in turn let the community know about opportunities for assistance.

Although they have been essential players in other counties, very few FBOs have gotten involved with the Palm Beach UNC and the United Way, creating a significant disconnect in the infrastructure of response and long-term recovery.

Another disconnect in infrastructure is the duplication of long-term recovery committees. The Palm Beach LTRC and the Glades Area Recovery Team (GART) are involved with the UNC, but the UNC itself seems to be currently discussing the possibility of incorporating as a long-term recovery organization. Unlike in other counties where the formalization of effective long-term recovery organizations has been catalyzed by outside groups such as FIND and Church World Services, our preliminary interviews did not discover a similar organization working effectively to assist the UNC or United Way in establishing such a body.

In addition, there seems to be little corporate involvement with the UNC/United Way. In conversations with various players, outlines of political divides (Republican and Democrat) and ideological faultlines (conservative and liberal; faith-based and social service oriented approaches) could be discerned.

CASE SNAPSHOT:

NORTHWEST FLORIDA
(Escambia & Santa Rosa Counties)

Dynamic Private Sector Leadership

The key players in Escambia and Santa Rosa counties in northwest Florida have recognized their interdependence as a single economic region and have thus come to work closely to coordinate rebuild efforts in the wake of Hurricane Ivan.

The most dynamic (and impatient) leadership has emerged from business leaders in the area, who have tapped into their business, faith, and social networks to secure resources and provide momentum to the recovery process.

A non-traditional long-term recovery organization—Rebuild Northwest Florida (RNF)—has emerged to coordinate the recovery initiatives for citizens of Santa Rosa and Escambia Counties. Established primarily by business leaders, RNF is a collaborative effort including: private citizens, non-profit organizations, FBOs, social service agencies, government entities and the private sector.

Garrett Walton, a key player in the organization, describes RNF as a "non-profit construction company." RNF set out to focus specifically on rebuilding and repairing the homes of those without insurance or those who are underinsured. They have relied on FEMA created long-term recovery committees (one in each county) for case work, at times being frustrated by the inefficiency and slowness of these committees (to the point of considering hiring private case managers).

FIND played a key role in catalyzing the formation of RNF, providing the framework and knowledge to incorporate and operationalize the initial idea of involved leaders.

Northwest Florida also has two Unmet Needs Committees, one in each county established at the request of the Fund. RND leaders suggest that this duplication is cumbersome and that money should be allocated by economic region rather than by county. They also believe the two FEMA long-term committees should be combined and should include business leaders in order to help ensure a more efficient process of case management.

Despite the duplication of committees in the region (two UNC, two LTRC) that has created some unwieldy communication and coordination problems, Rebuild Northwest Florida is pioneering one of the most responsive "can-do" rebuild efforts in the state.

CASE SNAPSHOT:

FLORIDA INTERFAITH NETWORKING IN DISASTER (FIND)

Catalyzing Effective Long-term Recovery through Collaboration

In 2002, Amy Sherman authored a study for Hudson Institute on the role of an emerging breed of not-for-profit organization, the faith-based intermediary. Sherman described intermediaries as organizations that help frontline service providers do what they do better. Intermediaries may provide technical assistance and other capacity building aids, administrative support, and financial resources to the organizations they assist. The conclusion of Sherman's report was that "intermediary organizations currently make enormous contributions to the scope, scale, and effectiveness of grassroots, faith-based social service agencies."

Over the past decade, Florida has benefited from the existence of its own unique brand of intermediary catalyst, Florida Interfaith/Interagency Networking in Disaster (FIND). FIND was established by Jodi Hill in 1994, following her experiences working on the ground in disaster recovery after Hurricane Andrew and the No Name Storm. Hill's vision has been to create a coalition of faith-based organizations, partnered with allied agencies and each other, which promotes networking to prepare Florida's communities for the effects of disaster, and in the aftermath facilitates spiritual and long term practical aid. FIND is there to help faith and community leaders as they identify and address disaster related unmet needs in their community.

In many counties after the 2004 hurricane season, FIND has been a key catalyst in the organization and incorporation of a new model of intermediary, the community interfaith/interagency network. Modeled on the best practices of and often emerging from FEMA-facilitated "long term recovery committees," this new breed of long-term recovery organization is a promising addition to Florida's infrastructure of disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.

FIND advocates the incorporation of long-term recovery organizations to formalize structures and processes for effective collaboration in communities during disaster recovery. Incorporation allows for an ongoing effort in each locale to increase publicity and stay engaged with for-profit sector for support; to serve as fiscal agents as well as effective collaborative allocating bodies; to secure mitigation grant money for local groups; to work post-recovery to harden community and homes against future disasters; and to address other long-term recovery issues as they arise specific to each locale.

CASE INTERVIEW CONTACTS

We made an effort to contact at least two individuals in each county, representing the Unmet Needs Committee, County Government, and/or the Long-Term Relief Committee/Community Interfaith/Interagency Network. The short timeframe posed challenges in scheduling. With additional time and resources, we believe that comprehensive, comparative case studies of these four counties would prove highly instructive both to the Fund, its donors and beneficiaries, and those affected by similar disasters in the future.

Friday, May 20, 2005
Roosevelt Alexander
Volunteer Florida Foundation
Director, Hurricane Relief Fund
850-488-0790
Roosevelt@volunteerflorida.org

Wednesday, May 18, 2005
Cedric Cox, Chair
Polk County Long-term Recovery Organization
Rebuild Polk After Disaster (RPAD)
(863) 534-7020 x130
ccox@peace-river.com

Tuesday, May 17, 2005
Robert Hebert
Charlotte County Government, Director of Recovery
Member of Charlotte County Unmet Needs Committee
941-743-1314
Robert.hebert@charlottefl.com

Monday, May 16, 2005
Jodi Hill, Executive Director
352-796-8387
jodyhill@FINDFlorida.org

Wednesday, May 18, 2005
Paul Milelli
Palm Beach County Government, Public Safety Department Director
Member of Palm Beach County Unmet Needs Committee
561-712-6470
Pmilelli@co.palm-beach.fl.us

Thursday, May 19, 2005
Ron Thomas, Vice Chair
Charlotte County
Long-term Recovery Organization
Interfaith/Interagency Network of Charlotte County (IINC)
941-380-3202
rthomas@charlottecountyhfh.org

Thursday, May 19, 2005
Garret Walton
Vice-President of Housing
Northwest Florida (Escambia & Santa Rosa)
Long-term Recovery Organization
Rebuild Northwest Florida (RNF)
RNF Website:
http://www.rebuildnorthwestflorida.com/home.asp

Also contacted but unavailable:

Northwest FL
Unmet Needs Committee

Palm Beach LTRC - GART (Glades Area Recovery Team)

Polk County
Unmet Needs Committee

Assessment of Issues

VFF/FHRF: Organizational Issues

- The ability of the small and limited staff to cover the wide range of geographic areas is an exceptional undertaking and the Study Team feels that this group of individuals handled this challenge in an exceptional manner.
- The Study Team sees the 3% Administrative Budget as a very limiting factor to the overall impact of the FHRF/VFF as an organization. Additional resources would allow for expanded facilitation and communication and would relieve some stresses on time for current staff. With the need to think creatively in some of these locations, the Study Team feels that the staff needs expansion to allow time for not just administration, but also communication and discussions. We also believe more resources could be made available in the future to assist in communicating with and informing local organizations.
- Although the Study Team understands that this entire effort was assembled in less than a few months, the need for clarification on who and what were eligible for funds was stated as an issue by many survey respondents.
- The Study Team feels that the FHRF organization needs to refine and understand its mission before engaging in the disbursement of more funds. Although, Phase I and II funds were effective, the Study Team feels there is a need for a pause and reflection on Mission before understanding disbursement of Phase III, in addition to understanding the Fund's long-term role as an organization.

Local Organizational Functionality: Issues

Few, if any, had any concept of this kind of disaster. Therefore, the efforts of all local organizations have been heroic. In review, several categories of issues emerged which must be addressed in the future. These include:

Case Management

Even in this preliminary investigation, which included only four case snapshots, we found there to be four major case management models emerging. Each of these models has positives and negatives. The point is, however, that the resources to service all of these models are extensive and may not result in the best efficiencies of both staff and local organization resources. These models include:

Distributive – A wide variety of nonprofit organizations conduct case work and the UNC/LTRC responds.

Collaborative – A "one table" model in which the case management table is outside the effective long-term rebuild organization. Organization (i.e. Northwest Rebuild) lets distinct LTRC organizations handle case management and sees role as a "do-er" of services, not a case manager.

Focused – A "one table" model in which the effective long-term rebuild organization manages case work because those focused on case work have been made a part of one larger organization.

Supplemental – The long-term recovery organization (UNC/LTRC) does only "unmet needs" case work.

Definition of Organizational Names

The Study Team has found that there are few standards in understanding the naming and roles of various organizations in this process. This lack of clarity has caused tremendous confusion and led to inefficiencies that could have been avoided. An example of this is the discussion of Unmet Needs Committees v. Long-Term Recovery Committees, etc.

Committee Membership

The Study Team has found that in many cases, the committee membership of Unmet Needs and Long Term Recovery Committees have not included enough of the private sector and local press. While social service organizations provide a strong network and history of this type of work, these other "types" of organizations and individuals are seen as needed resources to effectively rebuild the State.

Additionally, the Team seeks the need to have organizations on committees who understand the mission of the committee itself, not just the organization that they might represent. There has been numerous reporting of organizations simply using funding to continue already (previous to hurricanes) established projects.

Community-Wide Material Resources

The most commonly cited "unmet needs" faced by all communities were material needs for community-wide resources to facilitate rebuild and recovery. Such resources include community volunteer centers, volunteer housing, and warehouse space for building supplies.

Funding of Administration, not just materials

Many organizations have the ability to find funding for materials, but few are having much success with the funding alternatives for the management and administration of the operation of getting those materials and volunteers in place in the field.

Publicity

In the view of the country, the hurricanes of 2004 were just that, of 2004. Many see this problem as something has already been solved. The Study Team clearly sees (as anyone in the State would agree) that there is still major recovery to be completed. Yet, publicity on this fact is limited as local organizations and UNC/LTRC are not equipped to handle this kind of "marketing" effort.

THE FUTURE:

Understanding Mission Options

Looking to the future, the Volunteer Florida Foundation and the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund have many issues to address with the allocation of Phase III. Some of these issues include:

- What accountability to donors for funding of victims in need exists?
- How does funding have the best impact in the community?
- How can gaps in funding be filled most effectively?
- What are simple, yet accountable procedures for allocations of the funds?
- How can the Fund have awareness of needs?
- What is the best vehicle for fund distribution?
- Are FEMA applications an appropriate measure for allocating resources to communities or should the allocation be needs-based?

Additionally, there are several issues at the community level:

- What is the ability to pull together providers to collaborate in efforts?
- How do you rectify the struggle to determine preexisting needs from emergency responses?
- How to increase the capacity of the organizations providing services?
- Having enough case managers
- Resources
- Maintain intensity even when the general public is loosing interest?
- How do you protect vulnerable populations from future disasters?

While all of these questions cannot be answered in this study, the Team feels that they do stem from the need of VFF and FHRF to establish a clear and understandable mission. The following 11x17 diagram should be used to drive discussion on this topic with additional questions being asked on the pages following.

Florida Hurricane RELIEF FUND

What does the Fund want to be?
Three (3) Model Options for the Future

THE MISSION ?

The major issue facing the distribution of Phase 3 and beyond funds from the Florida Hurricane Relief Fund is the development of a clear mission for the organization. Clearly, the Fund has done great things in a short period of time with limited (but amazingly dedicated) staff and limited administrative resources. However, this study has clearly observed that there needs to be a clear definition of Mission for the Fund to work effectively in the future within the context of disaster relief and recovery in the State of Florida.

The study teams feels there are three major models from which the Board of the Fund and its Staff may choose in clarifying their mission and opperations. In following pages, the study will outline issues and recommendations related to each option. This series of diagrams are simplified versions of each model and are presented in this form to showcase each model's strengths and weaknesses.

QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED:

Who is our "Client"? Donors? Victims? Local Organizations? The State?

How much should the Fund engage government agencies to: Inform Planning? Shape Policy? Advocate for Victims?

If a more comprehensive mission is the chosen direction, how would that organization form? Where would it find its "home" or "role"? Does it exist as Volunteer Florida Foundation?

Does the Fund want to be a Pro-Active Organization or a Re-Active Organization? Is it here only for the 2004 Hurricane Relief or for a long term mission?

THE FUNDER of FISCAL AGENTS for Direct Relief

(Only a Hurricane Relief Fund; Goes inactive until next event)

PROS	CONS
Funds local organizations which might "know best" how to distribute funds to local needs.	*Relies on the ability of the fiscal agent or unmet needs committee to address issues and distribute funds, which is not always the best model.*
Reduces number of contacts for the Fund to just the local organization; not every recipient.	*The Fund is just a pass through from Donor. No additional knowledge about larger leverage or mitigation options is conveyed.*
Stays as a mechanism in place for future disaster events.	*Reactive model; Only in place active after an event happens.*

ENABLER OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

(Funds Long-Term Recovery Organizations with Larger Missions)

PROS	CONS
Funds local organizations to increase capacity and seek improvement in the long term, not just recovery.	*Relies on local organizations to be "long-term" and seek bigger solutions, which might not always be the case.*
Keeps VFF/FHRF focused on working with donors and not at the local level.	*Decentralizes knowledge and experiences. Communities will have to be willing to share information.*
Allows local organizations to craft process and approach according to their issues/climate/organizational structure.	*The question of how do you allocate funds will arise.*



THE "ONE-STOP SHOP" LARGE ORGANIZATION

(Long-term Organization; Finds solutions to bigger issues, not just hurricane relief and recovery)

PROS	CONS
Creates a new organization (or VFF) that seeks larger answers to issues in the community, not just recovery and relief.	*Is the model farthest from direct aid to victims.*
Proactive to issues; Always "on-the-clock" and not just a reactive organization to a disaster.	*Possibly creates a completely new organization. (Might be others already active with similar roles)*
Seeks to connect money and knowledge to communities through advocacy of larger issues.	*Requires a larger organizational framework and capacity.*

The Funder of Fiscal Agents

(Current Process)

- Volunteer Florida Foundation / Florida Hurricane Relief Fund
  - Continues to be a conduit for funds to the Community Long Term Recovery Committee
  - Develops funding parameters for fund distribution through specific programs determined by VFF
  - Maintain a focus on hurricane relief and rebuild
  - Maintains strong accounting and fiscal accountability
  - Minimize involvement in local issues

- Pros
  - Provides a clear and concise role for VFF through the FHRF
  - Establishes a phasing out strategy once program needs are finished
  - System in place to respond to future emergency needs

- Cons
  - Establishes a narrow role for the FHRF through target programs
  - Limits the potential of VFF as a change agent at the local level
  - Programs established at a "state" level – general and applicable to all

Enabler of Local Organizations

(Emphasis on the local level organization)

- Volunteer Florida Foundation / Florida Hurricane Relief Fund
  - VFF/FHRF is primarily the "gas for driving the cars" at the local level
  - Helps build the capacity of the local intermediary
  - FHRF becomes "community development" advocate
  - Coordinates activities for the local intermediary at the State level

- Pros
  - Gets expertise local
  - Allows each county to react to their context
  - Better chance for local collaboration
  - Local leveraging
  - Localized funding response

- Con
  - Local expertise questionable
  - Professionalism
  - Finding right person or persons to fill roles might be difficult
  - Local politics

The "One-Stop Shop" Large Organization

(Emphasis on the state level organization)

- Volunteer Florida Foundation / Florida Hurricane Relief Fund
  - Transform FHRF into a State intermediary to serve the Long Term Recovery Committees – possible name: Florida Hurricane Recovery Commission
  - Expand the mission to work as a proactive organization that works holistically to recovery and redevelop
  - Integrates community issues into effort to improve the quality of life and uses the hurricane as a catalyst for community improvement
- Pros
  - FHRC becomes "community development" advocate
  - Holds everything together
  - Increase visibility and funding potential

- Con
  - Impact on other VFF activities
  - Danger of becoming a bureaucracy
  - Distant from "grassroots" organization
  - Less flexible
  - Slow response time
  - Politics could play a large role